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The receiver is given broad authority to acquire, organize, and distribute the property of 
the estate and is vested with complete jurisdiction over the receivership property.5 Similar to a 
trustee in bankruptcy, an equity receiver has the authority to sue, but only to redress injuries to 
the entity in receivership.6 The equity receiver also has the authority to enter into settlements, 
subject to the district court’s finding of the agreement to be “fair and equitable and in the best 
interests of the estate.”7  
Furthermore, a district court has the authority and wide discretion to issue injunctions to 
prevent third-parties from diminishing property of the receivership estate.8 This power, in 
conjunction with the district court’s power to approve settlements, provides a framework for 
analyzing a settlement which requires injunctions on third-party claims against an insurer.9  
This memorandum addresses whether a district court, presiding over a securities-fraud 
receivership, has the power to enjoin third-party claims against insurers without an alternative 
compensation scheme. First, this memo explores the relationship between securities-fraud 
receivership and bankruptcy principles surrounding the court’s power to enjoin claims of third-
parties. Second, it analyzes the restrictions on the authority of the receiver and receivership court 
to extinguish third-party contractual claims. Lastly, it examines how courts have balanced these 
considerations to both protect assets of the estate and protect coinsureds with contractual rights 
in the receivership property. 
I. Equity and Bankruptcy Receivership Principles 
Because equity receiverships and bankruptcy receiverships share the same legal heritage, 
as well as serve common purposes, courts have looked to bankruptcy law to analyze conflicts in 
                                               
5 See 28 U.S.C. § 754. 
6 See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1995). 
7 See Tri–State Fin., LLC v. Lovald, 525 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2008). 
8 Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 840. 
9 See id. at 841-42; see also Matter of Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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equity receiverships.10 In fact, securities-fraud receiverships are essentially equivalent to a 
chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.11 Thus, courts have found bankruptcy caselaw and principles 
persuasive when analyzing conflicts in these equity receiverships.12  
 Similar to equity receiverships, under section 541(a) of title 11 of the United States Code 
(the “Bankruptcy Code”), a bankruptcy estate includes all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor.13 This provision has been interpreted as including all tangible and intangible property, 
including causes of action.14 Courts have consistently held that section 541(a) includes a debtor’s 
interest in liability insurance.15  
Once the defendant’s assets are in receivership, the district court has broad powers to 
determine the appropriate relief through both statutory and “ancillary relief” measures.16 District 
courts have thus exercised discretion in granting blanket stays of litigation which would reduce 
or interfere with receivership assets.17 Similarly, bankruptcy courts are expressly authorized to 
enjoin actions against non-debtor parties and channel those claims to the estate.18  
 In conjunction with this authority, receivership courts, like bankruptcy courts, have the 
ability to approve settlements of disputed claims when the settlement is “fair and equitable and in 
the best interest of the estate.”19 However, the power of the receiver and receivership court to 
approve a settlement which enjoins third-party claims is not unlimited.20  
                                               
10 See Janvey, 2014 WL 12654910 at *17; see also Wealth Mgmt. LLC, 628 F.3d at 334. 
11 See Wealth Mgmt. LLC, 628 F.3d at 334 (“The goal in both securities-fraud receiverships and liquidation 
bankruptcy is identical – the fair distribution of assets.”). 
12 See Janvey, 2014 WL 12654910 at *17; see also Wealth Mgmt. LLC, 628 F.3d at 334. 
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
14 See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-205 (1983). 
15 See Tringali, 796 F.2d at 553; see also In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 184 (5th Cir. 1984). 
16 See SEC v. Wenke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980); see also SEC v. Safety Fin. Services, Inc., 674 F.2d 368, 
372-73 (1982) (citing SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Assoc., 577 F.2d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
17 See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d 830; see also SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd., 424 F. App’x 338, 
340 (5th Cir. 2011) (“It is axiomatic that a district court has broad authority to issue blanket stays of litigation to 
preserve the property placed in receivership pursuant to SEC actions.”). 
18 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 155 (2009). 
19 See Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Kelley, 785 F.3d 273, 278 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Tri–State Fin., LLC v. 
Lovald, 525 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2008)). 
20 See infra Section II. 
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In order to examine the authority of a district court, the third-party claims against the 
insurers must be split into two categories. First, there may be contractual claims against the 
insurers for defense and indemnity payable from policy proceeds.21 Second, there may be 
independent, non-derivative, third-party claims against the insurers for tort or statutory 
violation.22 The authority of a court to approve a settlement that requires injunctions against 
third-party claims differs between the two, and thus must be examined separately.23  
II. Third-Party Contractual Claims against Insurers 
The first type of claim against the insurers involves contractual claims for defense and 
indemnity against lawsuits by the receiver. When an entity is put into receivership, the proceeds 
of its insurance policy become property of the estate. This is true both in equity receiverships and 
in bankruptcy proceedings.24 In Tringali, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
held that section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code was broad enough to include an interest in the 
debtor’s liability insurance as property of the estate.25 Similarly, corporate insurance policies and 
proceeds have been held to be property of the equity receivership in securities fraud 
proceedings.26 Because these insurance proceeds are considered part of the receivership estate, 
the court has the power to both settle claims regarding the disputed proceeds and enjoin claims 
that would either dissipate or interfere with these assets.27 However, when a settlement requires 
orders barring all actions against the insurers relating to the policies, as well as any claims to the 
                                               
21 See Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 845. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 See Tringali, 796 F.2d at 561. 
25 See id. at 560; see also MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 92 (1988) (“Numerous courts have 
determined that a debtor’s insurance policies are property of the estate, subject to the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction.”). 
26 See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 831; see also SEC v. Kaleta, 530 F’Appx 360 (5th Cir. 2013). 
27 See Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 840; see also Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Kelley, 785 F.3d at 278; 
see also Loewi Realty Corp. v. Chanticlear Assoc., Ltd., 592 F.2d 70, 73-73 (1979) (holding a bankruptcy court’s 
“power to preserve its jurisdiction by enjoining proceedings that would remove property from the bankruptcy estate 
is fundamental”). 
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receivership property, the court must take the fairness and interests of all parties claiming an 
interest in the estate into account.  
Courts have considered a number of factors in determining whether a settlement which 
requires the court to enjoin investors from filing claims against the third-parties closely affiliated 
with the receivership entities is fair and equitable.28 The Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Kaleta found that 
the injunction orders were necessary to obtain the settlement, preserved the investors rights to 
pursue claims through the receiver’s claim process, and did not strip investors from any other 
putative claims not associated with the underlying securities fraud action.29 These factors 
contributed to the settlement being fair, equitable, necessary, and in the interest of the 
receivership estate and its claimants.30 Similarly, in SEC v. DeYoung, the court approved a 
settlement that would enjoin claims by defrauded IRA account holders against a depository bank 
where the accounts were illegally commingled.31 There, the court noted that the defrauded 
account holders, pursuant to the settlement, would continue to have an avenue to file a claim 
against the receivership estate – preserving their legal right in the proceeds.32  
Claimants who are covered under the insurance policies have a legal right to share in the 
receivership assets.33 Therefore, a district court may not enjoin these third-parties from accessing 
any proceeds of the insurance policy by barring both claims against the insurers and claims 
against the receivership estate.34 In SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
district court lacked authority to approve a settlement which not only enjoined third-party claims 
against the insurers, but also specifically excludes the third-parties from the proceeds of the 
                                               
28 See SEC v. Kaleta, 530 F’Appx 360. 
29 See id. at 362-363. 
30 See SEC v. Kaleta, 2012 WL 401069 (S.D. Tex. Feb 7, 2012). 
31 See SEC v. DeYoung, 850 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2017). 
32 See id. at 1182-83. 
33 See Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 840. 
34 See Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 841-42. 
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receivership estate.35 By claiming the policy proceeds assets of the receivership estate and 
subsequently barring third-party coinsureds’ access to the proceeds, the overall fairness of the 
settlement was undermined.36 Thus, only a settlement between a receiver and insurer that 
preserves the rights of all claimants to share in the insurance policy proceeds will be considered 
“fair and equitable and in the best interests of the estate.”37  
This principle is also relevant in bankruptcy caselaw regarding injunctions on third-party 
claims against the debtor’s insurers. In In re SportStuff, Inc., the United States Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit held that a settlement which enjoined any party from 
pursuing claims against the insurers, while also limiting policy proceeds to personal injury 
claimants, violated the principles of fairness.38 The court noted that settlements which artificially 
terminate an insured’s right to a defense have been criticized.39 Thus, when a settlement 
impermissibly disposes of a third-party’s right to share in the proceeds of the insurance policy 
which they are insured under, the requirement that the settlement be fair and equitable is not 
satisfied.40  
III. Extracontractual Claims Against the Insurers 
The second type of claim relates to independent damage claims against insurers. These 
claims include common law bad faith breach of duty and possible state specific claims.41 These 
types of claims are independent, meaning “they do not arise from derivative liability nor do they 
                                               
35 See Id. at 846. 
36 See id. at 846-47. 
37 See id.; see also Tri–State Fin., LLC v. Lovald, 525 F.3d at 654. 
38 In re SportStuff, Inc., 430 B.R. 170, 179-80 (BAP 8th Cir. 2010). 
39 See Id. at 178; see also National Casualty Co. v. Insurance Company of North America, 230 F.Supp. 617 
(N.D.Ohio 1964) (citing 8 Appleman, Ins. Law & Prac. § 4685) (explaining that these settlements allow an insurer 
to “walk into court, toss the amount of the policy on the table, and blithely inform the insured that the rest was up to 
him”). 
40 See Id. at 179-80. 
41 See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 847 (examining injunction of claims relating to bad faith breach 
of duty and violation of the Texas Insurance Code). 
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seek contribution or indemnity from the estate.”42 Because these claims would not interfere with 
or diminish the assets of the receivership estate, they must be treated differently by the court.43  
A district court’s in rem jurisdiction limits its authority over independent, third-party 
claims.44 Courts have rejected a broad reading of 28 U.S.C. § 754, that suggests a court’s in rem 
jurisdiction extends to every claim connected to that property.45 Therefore, equity receivership 
courts, as well as bankruptcy courts, have held that a court may not authorize a settlement that 
enjoins independent third-party claims against the insurers.46  
Similarly, a receiver that does not have standing to sue, similarly does not have standing to 
settle.47 In a securities fraud proceeding, the insurance policy proceeds are considered the assets 
of the estate, but these third-party claims are completely unrelated to the receivership estate.48 
Thus, a receiver has no authority to enter a settlement, and the district court no authority to 
approve a settlement, which would bar third-party claims that have no relation to the insurance 
policy proceeds.49  
IV. Balancing Fairness and Protecting the Estate.  
To both adequately protect and preserve the property of the estate, while also recognizing 
the legal rights of third parties, a court should channel the third-party claims into the receivership 
estate.50 When a court “channels” the third-party claim, it protects the assets of the estate, while 
                                               
42 Id. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. at 841. 
45 See id.; see also Rishmague v. Winter, 2014 WL 11633690 at *2 (2015). 
46 See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 841-42; see also In re Vitek, 51 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a bankruptcy court has no authority to enjoin suits by coinsureds against insurers that were not 
property of the estate). 
47 See DSQ Prop. Co., Ltd. v. DeLorean, 891 F.2d 128, 131 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Wuliger v. Mfr’s Life Ins. Co., 
567 F.3d 787, 794 (6th Cir. 2009). 
48 See Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 847; see also In re Heritage Bond Litigation, 546 F.3d 667, 680 (2008) 
(holding that independent claims against settling defendant could not be barred by a court order). 
49 See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 848. 
50 See Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d at 846-47. 
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also preserving the legal rights of the coninsureds.51 For example, in MacArthur v. Johns-
Mansville Corp., the Second Circuit held that bankruptcy courts had the authority to approve 
settlements and “channel” claims arising under the policy to the property of the estate.52 The 
bankruptcy court determined that the Bankruptcy Code, under section 363(f), provides statutory 
support for the injunction orders.53 Under section 363(f), a receiver may sell the property in the 
estate so long as third-parties retain their respective rights in the proceeds of the sale.54  
Even if there were no statutory support for the ability of a district court to enjoin claims 
against insurers, relevant bankruptcy and securities-fraud caselaw has provided support for this 
power. Because securities-fraud receiverships are essentially the same as a chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding, relevant bankruptcy caselaw can be considered by the court in analyzing the 
conflict.55 In this context, the Supreme Court has held that a bankruptcy court has inherent 
authority to sell a debtor’s property and transfer third-party claims in the property to the proceeds 
of the sale.56 While the court in MacArthur noted that an insurance settlement and accompanying 
injunction are not identical to a traditional sale, the underlying principle of preserving the 
receivership assets and channeling claims into one proceeding remains the same.57 This 
channeling method has also been used by equity receivership courts to preserve assets of the 
estate.58 Therefore, when a third-party is enjoined from making a claim against an insurer 
pursuant to a settlement agreement, but instead given the right to file a claim against the 
receivership estate, the settlement will be fair and equitable.59  
                                               
51 See id. 
52 MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93. 
53 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
54 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(4); see also Ray v. Norseworthy, 90 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1874) (explaining that a court may 
sell the bankrupt’s property encumbered by third-party claims if third-party’s interest is retained in the proceeds 
from the sale). 
55 See Janvey, 2014 WL 12654910 at *17; see also Wealth Mgmt. LLC, 628 F.3d at 334. 
56 See Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931). 
57 See MacArthur, 837 F.2d at 94. 
58 See Kaleta, 530 F’Appx at 360; see also DeYoung, 850 F.3d at 1182. 
59 See MacArthur, 837 F.2d at 94; see also Kaleta, 530 F’Appx at 360; DeYoung, 850 F.3d at 1182. 
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Conclusion 
In order to provide adequate protection to both third-parties covered by the insurers, as well 
as preservation of receivership properties, a district court must have the authority to enjoin third-
party claims against the insurers. However, the district court is limited by its in rem jurisdiction, 
as well as general receivership principles, in its authority over the different types of third-party 
claims. To gain court approval as fair and equitable, a settlement must not only differentiate 
between contractual and extracontractual claims, but also preserve the legal rights of the third-
parties. So long as the third-party’s interest are transferred to the property of the receivership 
estate, the settlement between the receiver and insurer would be in the best interest of all parties. 
The settlement would provide maximum value to the receivership regarding the insurance policy 
proceeds while also giving coinsureds access to proceeds for defense and indemnity. Therefore, a 
court should limit its authority to approve settlements contingent on injunction orders to where 
there is an alternative compensation scheme for third-parties.  
 
 
